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ABSTRACT 
 
Nepotism, favoritism and cronyism, which can be seen in all sectors of today’s business world, 
have become quite common behavior. The granting of privileges to certain individuals is an 
extremely disturbing situation to the organization’s employees and the lack of trust arising under 
such conditions negatively affects job satisfaction, organizational loyalty, and individual 
performance, and can hinder the internal control system in the auditing process. In this study, the 
effects of nepotism, favoritism and cronyism on organizational loyalty regarding the internal 
control system in the auditing process in the Turkish textiles sector are examined.  In order to 
uncover the relationships in question, frequency breakdowns, Cronbach’s Alpha reliability testing, 
and regression analysis are performed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
f one examines the studies on family businesses, which are accepted as one of the important sources of 
economic development and growth (Olson et al., 2003), it is seen that they are generally for-profit social 
organizations created by individuals having kinship and business relationships with each other who come 
together to produce a product or service. In family businesses where family members hold effective positions, the 
family-member workforce’s commitment to the organization is considered an important competitive advantage. But 
also, kindred employees are perceived not as persons having individual autonomy based on knowledge and skills, 
but rather as people under the protection of the family. To some, the expression “family business” means higher 
performance relative to large-scale enterprises, while to others it brings to mind certain drawbacks. Among these 
drawbacks are nepotism, generational conflicts, and capital problems (Mac Farlin, 2008). The notion of nepotism is 
used today in the broad sense for the recruitment of relatives to the same business (Ford and Mc Laughin, 1985).  
The recruitment, promotion or granting of privileged access to the organization’s resources to persons lacking the 
necessary qualifications, but only based on their kinship and similar relationships, is thought to cause discontent, 
especially among the non-family employees (Arasli et al., 2006; Oren, 2007). Therefore, a lack of confidence in 
the people who are not family members can lead these people to consider themselves to belong to a different class. 
In turn, this can create the perception of favoritism in non-family employees (Ozler et al., 2007) and negatively 
affect the trust in the organization. 
 
In this regard, some processes need to be performed in accordance with the standards of the work area in 
the auditing process of the businesses. One phase of this process is the auditing of the internal control mechanism. 
Internal control is steered by the board of directors, managers and employees of a business organization in order to 
ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, the reliability of the financial reporting system, and regulatory 
compliance, and it is designed to provide reasonable assurance in this regard and defined as a system due to its place 
I 
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among business processes. According to the work area standards in the set of international auditing standards 
published by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), the examination of the internal 
control system is a requirement of the auditing process. The effects of the internal control system on the auditing 
process depend on the management’s ability to create, implement, and manage the internal control standards. This is 
only possible with the existence of a corporate management. However, the phenomena of nepotism, favoritism and 
cronyism cause negativities during the institutionalization of businesses and hinder the business management’s 
ability to manage this process well.  The remainder of this study is organized as follows. In the next sections, the 
concepts of family businesses, nepotism, favoritism, cronyism, and organizational trust are examined based on the 
literature. The proposed hypotheses and methodology are presented in the next section, together with the sample, 
instruments and findings of the research. Finally, in the last section, a brief summary and concluding remarks are 
presented with a discussion of the results, limitations, and suggestions for future studies. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Family businesses are seen as important sources of economic development and growth (Olson et al., 2003). 
If one examines the studies on family businesses, it is seen that they are generally for-profit social organizations 
created by individuals having kinship and business relationships with each other who come together to produce a 
product or service. One or more family members are in effective positions in the management of family businesses. 
The commitment of the family-member work force to the organization and strong family ties are suggested as an 
important competitive advantage of the majority of these businesses. Also, rules and regulations necessary for the 
internal control system and set by the management are prepared  
 
In addition to the internal control system as required by the management will be prepared within the 
framework of these family ties. Employees are seen not as persons having individual autonomy based on their 
knowledge and skills, but rather as people under the protection of the family. Therefore, the lack of trust in the 
persons who are not family members can cause these people to consider themselves to be in a different class. As a 
result, a perception of favoritism can emerge in the non-family employees (Ozler et al., 2007, 444). As for auditors, 
since misconduct and fraud in enterprises based on close kinships is less likely to occur (to be uncovered?), the 
impact of the internal control system in this regard needs to also be discussed. The term nepotism, derived from the 
Latin word Nepos meaning “nephew”, is defined by Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Merriam-
Webster, 2000) as the appointment of nephews or other kin to duties based on relationships rather than 
qualifications. Nepotism is defined as an individual’s attainment of recruitment, promotion, provision of more 
favorable working conditions and similar gains irrespective of their knowledge, abilities, skills, educational level, 
and experience but owing to their kinship ties (Ozsemerci, 2003). Favoritism is defined as the provision of special 
privileges to a friend, colleague or acquaintance in the areas of employment, career and personnel decisions 
(Merriam-Webster, 2000). Cronyism comes from the word crony, which originated as part of Cambridge University 
slang around the 1660s. Crony seems to have been intended to mean “friend of long-standing” (Dictionary of Word 
Origins, 1990). Cronyism appeared around 1840 and its original meaning was “the ability or desire to make friends.” 
It came into use in political parlance when in 1952 the Truman administration was accused of appointing friends to 
government posts regardless of their qualifications. A journalist on the New York Times described this practice as 
cronyism, thus modifying the meaning of word (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989). Thereafter, the neutrality and 
innocence of the word was destroyed. With this change of meaning of cronyism, crony now often entails a 
derogatory sense of friendship with a trace of political corruption or preferential treatment about it (Khatri and 
Tsang, 2003).  
 
Cronyism and favoritism are hard to control, especially in cultures that place a high value on interpersonal 
relations (http://www.citadel.edu/citadel), particularly to cronies,  especially as evidenced in the appointment of 
political hangers-on to office without regard to their qualifications (Ashour, 2004). 
 
According to others, nepotism, favoritism and cronyism are situations that eliminate or at least reduce 
firms’ costs of employee search, selection and probing for talent (Ponzo, 2009; Bellow, 2003). According to this 
view, employees typically connect with people having skills similar to theirs. Hence, among job applications 
businesses give priority of recruitment to those referred by their highly productive employees, believing that in this 
way they can recruit persons with skills similar to the employees’ (Montgomery, 1991). One of the negative effects 
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of nepotism, favoritism, and cronyism on human resources management recruitment and placement practices is the 
fact that candidates are recruited due to their friendships and bold ties. Because these people may not have sufficient 
knowledge and qualifications for the job, they may not perform as well as other candidates that have appropriate 
qualifications. This causes unproductiveness on the part of other employees in the enterprise and can negatively 
impact organizational justice, motivation and harmony. Such impacts can cause productive employees to leave their 
jobs over time and to make comments about the institution to customers, colleagues and people around them which 
can harm the operation and image of the institution (Araslı and Tumer, 2008). A similar view is that nepotism will 
lead to low efficiency in auditing family-member employees. According to this view, the interwoven nature of the 
parent-child relationship will lead parent-owners of the business to biases and to make incorrect judgments in 
evaluating their own children (Lubatkin, 2005; Schulze et al., 2003; Schulze et al., 2001). This may cause audit 
reports to be far from reflecting the reality. The reason for this is that nepotism, favoritism and cronyism can affect 
the optimal preparation of the internal control system which constitutes the preparatory phase of the auditing 
process. This situation can have adverse effects on the efficacy of the auditing process. In nepotism, prevalent 
generally in family firms in many countries and which can be defined as the inter-generational transfer of 
management (Scoppa, 2009), when the founder of the business retires the control of the firm is typically handed 
over to the founder’s heir instead of a business professional (Burkart, 2003; Bertrand and Schoar, 2006), which 
generally reflects the preferences of the founder who may sacrifice the firm’s decision for the personal satisfaction 
from his or her own heir managing the enterprise. Despite this, the findings of many studies point to the fact that 
reduced performance occurs in firms that implement family inheritance of management (Perez-Gonzales, 2006). 
Many studies’ results show that as negative sentiments toward the organization increase, the trust level of its 
employees decrease.  Trust in the system is brought out by the written rules that the system community has and the 
determination of the rule-setting institutions in implementing them. Trust derives from the individual’s belief that 
his or her rights will be protected by the system’s written rules (Esmer, 1999). The word trust is defined in the 
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2004) as “assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of 
someone or something.”  
 
In another definition organizational trust is indicated as the “employees’ trust in the management and their 
degree of belief in what the management tells them.” According to this definition, the source of organizational trust 
is the behavior of the upper-level and intermediate-level managers (Simsek and Tasci, 2004). Without organizational 
trust, the probability of the organization reaching its goals is either very low or nil. Trust is a basic human value that 
needs to be developed in every organization (Smith, 2005). Trust in an organization affects many variables such as 
individuals’ job satisfaction, organizational justice, organizational commitment, organizational belonging, problem 
solving skills, risk-taking behavior, and creativity. Cook and Wall (1980) mention that the trust between individuals 
and groups is an important component of the organization’s long-term profitability and the prosperity of the 
organization’s members.  
 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
Many studies point to the importance of trust inside an organization. In some of these studies it is observed 
that organizations having a higher level of trust are more successful, easily adaptable, and innovative relative to 
organizations with a lower level of trust. 
 
Organizational trust is associated with all employees’ job satisfaction and the organization’s perceived 
effectiveness (Huff and Kelley, 2003), and it plays an important role in organizational activities and processes such 
as development of collaborative behavior, performance appraisal, goal setting, leadership, building of team spirit 
(McAllister, 1995; Jones and Geroge, 1998; Mayer et al., 1995), organizational commitment, and contribution to 
employee satisfaction (Huff and Kelley, 2003). 
 
Cook and Wall’s (1980) study arrives at the conclusion that there is a positive relationship between one’s 
trust in coworkers and their job satisfaction. Different organizational structures affect the development of different 
formations of trust (Creed and Miles, 1996), and it is claimed that in the absence of trust, group members are less 
willing to show collaborative behavior (Henttonen and Blomqvist, 2005).  Trust is a most fundamental, most 
effective, and most constructive factor regarding both intra-group dynamics and mutual relationships. In the absence 
of trust chronic suspicion prevails, leading individuals to beware of and avoid each other (Shaw, 1997). 
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Along these lines of thought, the study aims to uncover the kind of relationship between nepotism, 
favoritism and cronyism in firms and the employee’s perception of organizational trust. In parallel to the findings in 
the literature, we propose the following hypotheses: 
  
Hypothesis 1: Nepotism has a significant negative effect on organizational trust in family firms. 
Hypothesis 2: Favoritism has a significant negative effect on organizational trust in family firms. 
Hypothesis 3: Cronyism has a significant negative effect on organizational trust in family firms. 
  
METHOD 
 
The survey method is used in this study via a questionnaire including a nepotism scale and an 
organizational trust scale together with demographic information. We analyze the data by simple linear regression 
for testing the hypotheses. 
 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
Data were collected using the convenience sampling method from 240 employees working in different 
units of family businesses in Istanbul. The sample consists of 55 females (22.9%) and 185 males (77.1%). The 
employee sample has ages between 19-56 years with a mean of 31.29 years. The educational levels of the sample is 
distributed as 14.6% having primary school education (35), 41.6% having high school education (100), 36.2% 
having a university (undergraduate) degree (87), and 7.5% having a master’s degree (18). With respect to company 
size, 7.1% work at very small companies (1-9 employees), 8.3% work at small businesses (10-49 employees), 41.2% 
work at medium-size businesses (50-150 employees), and 43.3% work at large-scale enterprises (151 or more 
employees). 
 
INSTRUMENTS 
 
The survey was implemented on non-kin-related employees of nine family businesses in the textiles 
industry in the Istanbul province. Company officials were contacted to be informed about the goal of the study, and 
the survey form was implemented on a total of 252 employees by pollsters. Of these survey forms, 240 suitable for 
analysis were taken into evaluation. Primarily, exploratory factor analysis results were examined for the construct 
validity of the scales and the Cronbach’s Alpha value was examined for the survey’s reliability. 
 
Nepotism, Favoritism and Cronyism Questionnaire 
 
Abdala et al (1998) developed this scale and it was translated into Turkish by  Araslı and Tumer. The 
questionnaire consists of 25 questions with a 5-point Likert response scale. Factor analysis yields a KMO coefficient 
of 0.847, which is greater than 0.7 and close to 1, thus showing the suitability of the factor analysis. The Barlett test 
value is a significant 0.00 (<0.05), validating the factor analysis. The scale consisting of 25 questions is grouped by 
the factor analysis under three dimensions, where the factor weights vary between 0.581 and 0.887. The first 
dimension is nepotism, the second is favoritism, and the third is cronyism. The Cronbach’s alpha value of the 25 
expressions is 0.945 and the Cronbach’s alpha values of each dimension are 0.855 for nepotism, 0.821 for 
favoritism, and 0.886 for cronyism.  
 
Organizational Trust Questionnaire 
 
This scale was introduced by Daboval, Comish, Swindle and Gaster (1994) and was translated into Turkish 
by Kamer (2001). The scale consists of three dimensions: personnel policies, superior-subordinate relationships, and 
communications. Each dimension contains 12 questions with a 5-point Likert-type scale, making a total of 36 
questions. While it is known that the validity and reliability studies of this inventory were done by Daboval, Comish, 
Swindle and Gaster, their results are not available. However, in a reliability test by Kamer (2001) the Cronbach’s 
alpha value was calculated as 0.966.  
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In the study, the factor analysis results for the organizational trust scale yield a KMO coefficient of 0.873, 
which is greater than 0.7 and close to 1, thus indicating the suitability of the factor analysis. The significance of the 
Barlett test (p=0.000) validates the factor analysis results. The scale consisting of 36 questions is grouped by the 
factor analysis under three dimensions, where the factor weights vary between 0.533 and 0.729. The first dimension 
is superior-subordinate relationships, the second is communication, and the third is personnel policies. The 
Cronbach’s alpha value of the 36 expressions is 0.939 and the Cronbach’s alpha values of each dimension are 0.826 
for superior-subordinate relationships, 0.751 for communication, and 0.766 for personnel policies. The 
organizational trust variable in the study is formed by 18 expressions subdivided into three dimensions.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
We explore the effect of nepotism, favoritism and cronyism on organizational trust by simple linear 
regression. Simple regression analysis is done with the purpose of finding the power with which (the value of) an 
independent variable can explain the (value of the) dependent variable. In regression analysis, the ANOVA test 
reveals the validity of the model. If the ANOVA significance level is greater than 0.05, the model is considered to be 
invalid, if it is smaller, it is then considered valid; i.e., the independent variable can successfully explain the 
dependent variable (Kalayci, 2006). 
 
Prior to the regression analysis for each hypothesis, the normality and linearity assumption between the 
variables were checked and found not to be violated. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Hypothesis 1: Nepotism has a significant negative effect on organizational trust at in family firms. 
 
The regression analysis results for the first hypothesis indicate a medium-level negative relationship 
between nepotism and organizational trust (R=0.675) and that nepotism can explain 45.5% of the variance of 
organizational trust (R
2 
= .455). Looking at the ANOVA values, there is no issue regarding the significance of the 
model’s explanatory power (F=198.730, p=0.000), as shown in Table 1. 
 
  
Table 1:  Model Summary 
Model R R2 Adjusted R2 Std. Error of Estimate F Sig. 
1 .675(a) .455 .453 .86995 198.130 .000(a) 
a Predictors: (Constant), Nepotism 
b Depent Variable: Organizational Trust 
  
 
The estimated regression model parameters are all individually significant (at the 5% significance level). 
The constant term is 5.695 and the nepotism coefficient is -0.807. According to this, whenever there is a one unit 
increase in nepotism, there is a 0.807 unit decrease in organizational trust, as shown in Table 2. 
 
 
Table 2:  Coefficients 
Model 
 Unstandardized Coefficient Standardized Coefficient   
 Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 Constant 5.695 .214  26,639 .000 
 Nepotism -.807 .057 -.675 -14,099 .000 
  
 
The regression analysis results support the first hypothesis that “Nepotism has a significant negative effect 
on organizational trust.” The coefficient values obtained by the regression analysis are depicted in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Favoritism has a significant negative effect on organizational trust in family firms. 
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The results obtained for the second hypothesis indicate a medium-level negative relationship between 
favoritism and organizational trust (R=-0.609) and that favoritism can explain 37.1% of the variance of 
organizational trust (R
2 
= .371). Looking at the ANOVA values, there is no issue regarding the significance of the 
model’s explanatory power (F=140.102, p=0.000). The estimated regression model parameters are all individually 
significant. The constant term is 4.905 and the favoritism coefficient is -0.626. According to this, whenever there is 
a one unit increase in favoritism, there is a 0.626 unit decrease in organizational trust. The regression analysis 
findings support the second hypothesis that “Favoritism has a significant negative effect on organizational trust.”   
 
Hypothesis 3: Cronyism has a significant negative effect on organizational trust in family firms. 
 
 For the third hypothesis, it is found that there is low-level negative relationship between cronyism and 
organizational trust (R=-0.365) and that cronyism can explain 13.3% of the variance in organizational trust (R
2 
= 
.133). The ANOVA values indicate no issues regarding the significance of the model’s explanatory power 
(F=36.645, p=0.000). The estimated regression model parameters are all individually significant. The constant term 
is 4.108 and the cronyism coefficient is -0.383. According to this, a one unit increase in cronyism results in a 0.383 
unit decrease in organizational trust. The regression analysis findings support the third hypothesis that “Cronyism 
has a significant negative effect on organizational trust.” 
  
CONCLUSION 
 
 The aim of this study is to explore the effects of nepotism, favoritism and cronyism on the organizational 
trust in the auditing process in family businesses. The results of the study are in the hypothesized directions of 
nepotism, favoritism and cronyism being negatively related to organizational trust. The main finding of this study is 
that nepotism, favoritism and cronyism reduces organizational trust in family businesses. 
 
 In our review of the literature, we find that Lashinger and Finegan (2005) conclude that when the employee 
cannot access information on organizational decisions and actions and suspects that the information is confidential 
or is kept secret from the employee himself, his sense of trust in the management is lost. Singer and Tang (1996) 
state that distrust in the management leads to confrontations between employees and negatively affects individual 
performance. The results of Perez-Gonzales (2006) also agree with the body of literature arguing that in many 
situations, family ties and social connections lead to the recruitment of less-skilled personnel and cause the firm to 
display poor performance.  
 
Although organizational trust is affected by nepotism, favoritism and cronyism in a structural model, this 
study also has some limitations. The observed relationship between the study variables is constrained by the selected 
sample. Obtaining more generalizable results requires comparing the existing results with qualitatively and 
quantitatively different samples.  
 
The relationship between nepotism, favoritism and cronyism and organizational trust was identified in this 
study. Future research should focus on other organizational variables, such as performance, turnover, commitment, 
satisfaction and absenteeism, and should explore the relationship between nepotism, favoritism and cronyism and 
these variables. 
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